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Abstract
In my thesis, I examine the theory of fair division of infinitely divisible heterogenous
goods from measure theoretic context. I present the main existence theorems of
divisions, give graphical representations of division and give an introduction to the
algorithmic literature in the area.
To present the results, I first define the formal measure theoretic model used in
the literature and discuss the concept of fairness. I present the existence theorems
of Weller and Dubins and Spanier that give results for the existence of a number of
different divisions. With the existence theorems I also discuss the limitations of the
model, and look into the impact of some assumptions of the formal model concerning
the existence theorems. I present two different geometrical interpretations that can
be used to understand and find fair allocations, and in the final part, I consider three
algorithms to achieve a fair division.
Keywords Fair division, economics, measure theory
Contents
1 Introduction 4
2 Model 5
3 Theory of fairness 6
4 Existence of fair allocation 8
4.1 Dubins & Spanier approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2 Weller approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3 Problem of countable additivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5 Graphical representations 11
5.1 Individual Pieces Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2 Radon-Nikodym Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6 Algorithms 18
6.1 Banach–Knaster last-diminisher procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.2 Brams & Taylor procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.3 nn
nn
nn
queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7 Conclusion 20
References 22
3
1 Introduction
An economist is hosting a birthday party and wants to divide a cake between
their guest who all have equal rights to the cake. Each guest has their own
preferences for different parts of the cake with different toppings spread out
unevenly. It is of utmost importance for the economist that the division is fair.
But what fair means? How can they know such a division exists?
The question of fair division is an age-old problem with first written records
of it appearing already in the Bible (Brams & Taylor 1996). First time in aca-
demics, the Polish mathematicians studied the problem during the World War
II and the first formal description of the problem was given by Hugo Stein-
haus (1948). The question has been studied ever since by researchers across
multiple disciplines including economics, mathematics, computer science, and
operations research. The issue is relevant not only in academics with issues
of income distribution, education policy, health care, and many others closely
related to the notion of fairness.
Due to the broad nature of the subject, I limit the scope of my thesis to
infinitely divisible goods. The model I use applies both to homogenous and
heterogeneous goods. Similarly to the presentation in modern fair division lit-
erature, I approach the subject from measure theoretic context.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Firstly some definitions and the
formal model is needed. Then I will look into how fair division can be defined.
Before continuing any further, it is reassuring to know whether the aimed divi-
sion exists and thus an overview of theorems of the existence of fair divisions is
needed. Also, I will present two kinds of graphical representations of division
that hopefully help give better intuition of the subject. Finally, I briefly dis-
cuss the literature on getting to the fair divisions and present a few algorithms
relating to it. In the end, I also discuss the possible applications of fair divi-
sion literature. Along the way, I will present the most important theorems and
results from the over 70-year history of the formal study of this subject.
Throughout the thesis, I will attempt to keep the notation the same that
is introduced in the first section and therefore, it may differ from the original
material. Despite the rather mathematical style of my thesis, I will omit proofs
and reasonings for some of the theorems and result by citing to the original
material aside from the most important theorems where the ideas leading to
the main results are presented.
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2 Model
The ”cake” that is denoted by Ω is a set that needs to be divided between the set
I = {1, 2, . . . n} of players who each have equal rights to get a share. Typically
Ω is the closed interval [0, 1] ∈ R, but it can be any set. The objective is to
find disjoint subsets of Ω for each player. The collection of the disjoint subsets,
denoted by B is a σ-algebra on Ω. Mathematically Ω and the σ-algebra B form
a measurable space (Ω,B). B has the following properties (Folland 1999):
1. Ω ∈ B.
2. If Ei ∈ B ∀i ∈ N, ∪∞1 Ei ∈ B (closed under countable unions).
3. If E ∈ B, then Ec ∈ B (closed under complements).
Players use probability measure µ : B → [0, 1] to assess their utility on B. µ
equipped with the following two properties (Folland 1999):
1. µ(∅) = 0
2. µ(∪∞1 Ej) =
∑∞
1 µ(Ej) given that {Ej}∞1 is disjoint.
Often µ is also assumed to be non-atomic, i.e. for any A ∈ Ω, if µ(A) > 0, there
exists B ⊂ A such that µ(A) > µ(B) > 0. Additionally, if µi is called absolutely
continuous with respect to µj , then for every set A ⊂ Ω if µi(A) = 0, then also
µj(A) = 0.
Now that the formal framework is defined, the goal of fair division can be
discussed. In this work, it is assumed that the players prefer a bigger part of
Ω though in some literature also a smaller is better approach is considered. To
characterise different divisions specifically and to discuss the notion of fairness,
the following definition of some most used properties of division is needed.
Definition 1. Let P = (A1, P2, . . . An) be a partition of Ω. It is (Barbanel
2005):
• Proportional if and only if µi(Ai) ≥ 1n ∀i ∈ I.
• Envy-free if and only if µi(Ai) ≥ µi(Aj) ∀i, j ∈ I.
• Equitable if and only if µi(Ai) = µj(Aj) ∀i, j ∈ I.
• Pareto efficient if and only if @P ′ = (B1, . . . Bn) 6= P such that µi(Bi) ≥
µi(Ai) ∀i ∈ I with at least one inequality being strict.
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Note that in some earlier literature the term equitable was used to mean
envy-free, but in modern literature, envy-free is the used term. Also, propor-
tional division is called super-proportional if all inequalities are strict.
Verbally, a division is proportional if each player thinks that they get at
least the average size of the cake. Envy-freeness means that each player values
their own piece at least as much as everyone else’s. Equitable division requires
everyone’s valuation of their own piece to be the same. If no other division exists
such that someone’s valuation increases, the division is called Pareto efficient.
3 Theory of fairness
The question of what is fair is a rather philosophical one. Given the cake
analogy, the intuitive answer is to divide the cake into equal parts but is it
fair? What if some of the players dislike some subset of the cake that they are
given in equal division and would prefer some other piece? In other words, some
player envies the piece of some other player. Can the division be called then
fair? In the context of a division between two players, the classical solution
to this is the ”I cut, you choose” protocol to keep both happy which also has
been generalised for any number of players discussed in section 6.1. This indeed
guarantees proportionality and envy-freeness but is it the definitive answer?
The purpose of this section is not to take a normative stance on what is fair
but rather introduce some the different concepts of fairness proposed that are
needed later in this thesis.
The term theory of fairness was first used in Varian (1974), and the no-
tion of fairness has been extensively researched by economists since the 1960’s
when the envy-freeness was first proposed as an allocation rule (Foley 1967).
Envy-freeness was later expanded with Pareto efficiency by Schmeidler and
Yaari (Varian 1974) that is called here Varian-fair to avoid confusions. This
definition of fairness has been extensively used by welfare economists ever since.
Definition 2 (Varian-fair (Varian 1974)). A partition P = (A1, A2, . . . An) of
Ω is a (Varian) fair allocation if it is both envy-free and Pareto optimal.
Varian (Varian 1976) does give some reasoning that does make this defini-
tion useful in economics. Firstly, as the envy-freeness condition only includes
”internal” comparisons, no one needs to know the utilities of other players.
Envy-freeness also implies that the allocation is stable (Varian 1974) since no
player would trade their part with anyone else. Lastly, if there are two envy-free
allocations but with the other, each player is better off, why not choose it and
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hence the Pareto efficiency. But as will be seen, in practice Pareto efficiency is
hard to achieve without knowing every players’ utilities.
In addition to the Varian’s definition fairness, many other goals of fair divi-
sion have been used. Most notably, perhaps a more common goal in the earlier
mathematics and computer science literature proportional or equitable divisions
have been considered. Another concept of optimal division needed in this work
is the one Dubins and Spanier (1961) defined as optimal division, called here
DS-optimality:
Definition 3 (DS-optimality (Dubins & Spanier 1961)). Arrange utilities µj(Aj)
of every partition P = (A1, . . . An) in non-decreasing order and designate the
resulting sequence as
a1(P ) ≤ · · · ≤ an(P )
P is a DS-optimal partition if for any P ′ either ai(P ) = ai(P ′) ∀i or if j is the
smallest i such that ai(P ) 6= ai(P ′), then aj(P ′) < aj(P ).
The idea in DS-optimality is to maximise the utility of the player whose
utility is the smallest. From the remaining partitions find the one that maximises
the utility of the second last person and continue towards the first person. The
problem from an economics point of view is that to achieve this, one would
need to know the utilities of each player which is difficult in practice. As noted
in Weller (1985), DS-optimal divisions are also necessarily Varian-fair under
countably additive measures and is much stricter requirement than the Varian-
fairness.
The review of different definitions of fairness here is far from exhaustive
(see Thomson (2011) for a comprehensive review) but is sufficient for the needs
of this work and should be enough the understand what kind of questions are
related to fairness. As no single definition is taken here, multiple notions of
fairness are considered here and the constraints they impose.
However, one could argue that Pareto efficiency is a reasonable goal in all
cases and it is commonly the aim in economics literature and more recent fair
division works even though efficiency doesn’t really characterise fairness in the
same way than the other notions of fairness introduced. Nevertheless, as Thom-
son (2011) noted, the efficiency issues were largely ignored by mathematical
literature until recently, and therefore, the older results do not consider effi-
ciency issues.
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4 Existence of fair allocation
The fundamental question before trying to divide anything fairly is that does
such division exist in the first place. Two most notable papers on the existence
of divisions in measure theoretic models are presented here, the arguably more
mathematical Dubins & Spanier (1961) one and the one by Weller (1985) that
was analogous to Varian’s approach albeit from measure theoretic context. Ad-
ditionally, a short discussion on the countable additivity assumption is given at
the end.
4.1 Dubins & Spanier approach
The existence of DS-optimal division and a few others was shown by Dubins and
Spanier (1961) in their paper the main results of which are presented here. Their
proof relied much on the Lyapunov convexity theorem that is also generally
important in fair division literature and hence also presented here.
Theorem 1 (Lyapunov’s convexity theorem (Diestel & Uhl 1977)). Let Σ be
σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, X a finite dimensional Banach space and µ : Σ→ X
a non-atomic, countably additive vector measure. The range of µ is a compact
and convex subset of X.
The idea of Dubins and Spanier in using the Lyapunov’s theorem was as
follows. Let P = (A1, . . . Ak) be an ordered partition of Ω. Then associate
P with M(P ) = [µi[Aj ]1≤j≤k]j∈I , an n × k matrix that maps each element of
partition P to the measure of each agent. The Lyapunov’s theorem was then
applied to show that the range R of function M is convex and that it is compact
given that each µ is non-atomic and countably additive.
Now it only remains to show that this result implies that different fair di-
visions exist that is replicated here. First division considered was the exact
one.
In other words, given non-negative real numbers α1, . . . , αk such that
∑
αi =
1, there exists a partition P = (A1, . . . , Ak) such that µi(Aj) = αj for all
i < n, j < k. Now for all j < k let Pj = (A1, . . . , Ak) be a partition in which
element Aj = 1 and Ai = ∅ ∀i 6= j. As a result, Convexity of R implies that∑
αjM(Pj) ∈ R and hence there exists a partition P such that the jth columns
of M(P ) and
∑
αjM(Pj) are equal. Note that this result does not imply that
everyone gets a single piece, the piece may be a union of multiple pieces from the
cake. Note that if weights are chosen at 1/n, this result implies that equitable
division is achievable.
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Next corollary of the compactness and convexity of R was that a super-
proportional division exists if at least two measures are not identical. Or again
given non-negative real numbers α1, . . . , αn such that
∑
αi = 1, there exists a
partition P = (A1, . . . , An) such that µ(Ai) > αi ∀i. Now let µ1 6= µ2 and hence
there exists A such that µ1(A) > µ2(A) and if B = {A, µ2(B) > µ1(B). By
symmetry, it can now be seen that µ1(A)/α1 ≥ µ2(B)/α2. Let P0 be a partition
where A is allocated for player 1 B for player 2 and nothing for the other players
and let Pi for i > 2 be a partition where the entire Ω is given for player i. The
Lyapunov’s theorem now implies that for each non-negative numbers x1, . . . , xn
with
∑
xi = 1 there is a partition P = (A1, . . . , An) such that
M(P ) = x1M(P0) +
∑
i≥2
xiM(Pi). (1)
The primary interest of this is the diagonal of M(P ), and each xi needs to
be found such that the entries in the diagonal are in the same ratio as αi, i.e.
the equations
x1µ1(A) = λα1, (2)
x1µ2(B) = λα2, (3)
xi = λαi for i > 2. (4)
By solving (2)–(4) for xi, summing them and using
∑
αi = 1,
λ =
(
1 +
α1
µ1(A)
(1− µ1(A)− µ2(B))
)−1
. (5)
As 1−µ1(A)−µ2(B) < 0 and α1µ1(A) < 1, it must be so that λ > 1 and therefore
choosing xi = αi, the ith entry of the diagonal of (1) is λαi > αi.
Finally, given that R is compact, it follows immediately that a DS-optimal
division exists. With these results, most of the notions of fairness in Definition
1 are known to exist in addition to the DS-optimality.
4.2 Weller approach
Varian (1974) used Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurikiewicz lemma along with a num-
ber of assumptions on preferences to prove that Varian-fair division exists if
either preferences are convex or no two weakly Pareto efficient allocations ex-
ist that all agents regard as indifferent and Svensson (1983) showed later than
weaker assumptions also are sufficient.
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The goal of Weller (1985) however was to show the same result in measure
theoretic model with the main result being that a Varian-fair division of meas-
urable space exists. Their proof relied on something they called combinatorial
optimality concept and the construction of Pareto efficient allocation similarly
as in Section 5.2 and then showing that they exist along with envy-freeness. In
this subsection, the measures need not to be absolutely continuous.
Weller constructed the n− 1 dimensional simplex with Radon-Nikodym de-
rivatives of the measure functions that later was named as Radon-Nikodym Set
introduced in Section 5.2 with a bit different notation. The idea was to map
each point of the cake to a simplex depending on the relative utility of it for
the players. The theorem that Weller then prove was that given a point in the
interior of the simplex, if n closed areas can be formed for each player who gets
the parts of the cake that belongs to their area every such division is Pareto
efficient.
After establishing this, the efficiency had to be combined with envy-freeness.
Weller used the Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to show that the mapping from
the interior of the simplex to the set of subsets of the simplex contains a fixed
point y = (y1, . . . , yn). The result from a fixed point is that an efficient partition
P = (A1, . . . , An) exists such that
yi =
µi(Ai)∑
j∈I µj(Aj)
. (6)
This division now only needs to be envy-free. If a point x = (x1, . . . , xn) is
taken from the simplex, Weller showed that for any two agents
mi(Ai)
xi
≥ µj(Ai)
xj
. (7)
By taking a ratio for two players of (6) and combining with (7) one can get the
definition of an envy-free division, and hence a Varian-fair division exists.
As a final note, Weller also related Pareto efficiency and envy-freeness to DS-
optimality. The conclusion is that DS-optimality is much stricter than Pareto
efficiency and if measures are assumed to be absolutely continuous, all DS-
optimal divisions are fair. DS-optimality being stricter than efficiency is rather
intuitive. Take Pareto efficient partition P is arranged to non-decreasing order
and from the second-worst off player a sufficiently small measurable part is
taken to the worst off player, the result is more optimal according to Dubins &
Spanier.
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4.3 Problem of countable additivity
For economists, a major issue with the existence theorems is that the measures
need to be countably additive, and hence linear, which becomes problematic if
for example, decreasing marginal utility is assumed. Furthermore, some players
may get allocated a piece that is a union of multiple measurable subsets of
Ω, which is potentially problematic in some applications, say land division.
The economists’ guests may also be somewhat disappointed if they are given
a plateful of crumbles from the cake. With this motivation, some remarks are
valuable concerning to the existence theorems if countable additivity of measures
is not guaranteed.
Some of the results of Berliant et al. (1992) are presented here to give
some reassurance for the economist’s guests. The issue is that if countable
additivity is not assumed, much can not be said of some general set functions
and hence some assumptions are needed. To relate with decreasing marginal
utility, the set functions can be intuitively assumed to be concave and and
subadditive (Berliant et al. 1992). Subadditivity for set function µi : B → R
means that for all A,B ∈ B s.t. A ∩B = ∅, µi(A ∪B) ≤ µi(A) + µi(B).
Berliant et al. (1992) impose a modified Hausdorff topology where the set
of measurable partitions is compact. If all the set functions are assumed to be
continuous, each µi is continuous and with this, it follows that Pareto efficient,
DS-optimal, and utilitarian partitions exist.
In conclusion, the objectives of division need not to be abandoned if measures
are not linear, but in this approach, the properties of measure functions imply
that they can not be used the same way.
5 Graphical representations
To give a picture of what the division looks like and additionally to see the
importance of the Lyapunov’s theorem, two different graphical representations
of fair division are introduced. The examples may only be intuitively drawn
for two or three players, but the concepts are also usable in higher dimensions,
albeit not graphically.
First, the Individual Pieces Set, or IPS is introduced that gives the feasible
set of all possible partitions.
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5.1 Individual Pieces Set
The Individual Pieces Set term has been introduced by Barbanel, whose ex-
amples (Barbanel 2000) are adopted here. Without getting any further into
details, the definition of the Individual Pieces Set (IPS) is needed.
Definition 4. Individual Pieces Set (Barbanel 2000) The Individual Pieces Set
that associates Ω and probability measures (µ1, µ2, . . . , µn) is the set
{µ1(A1), . . . , µn(An) | P = (A1, . . . , An) is a partition of Ω}
Intuitively, the IPS contains all the possible points that the measure func-
tions can give with possible partitions of Ω.
Before going to the pictures, properties of the IPS (Barbanel 2000) should
be discussed. First notable property by the Lyapunov’s theorem is that the IPS
is a closed and convex set. Also as the measure functions are here probability
measures, the IPS is a subset of [0, 1]n where n is the number of players. Finally,
the IPS contains the points (0, . . . 0, 1, 0, . . . 0) where 1 is at index i for all i ∈ I
as the entire Ω is given to a single player, and their measure of the entire cake
is then 1.
With these properties established, the construction of a few examples when
n = 2 can be begun. The easiest and the most obvious example is the case of
µ1 = µ2.
Firstly based on the previous, discussion it is known that points (0, 1) and
(1, 0) are in the IPS. The points (0, 1) and (1, 0) must be then connected such
that the IPS is closed and convex by the Lyapunov’s theorem. Hence a line
connecting the two points is at least included in the IPS, but in this case, as the
measures are identical, the straight line between the two points must contain all
the possible points. This is because the utility of one player is always the utility
of the other with the same part of the cake and one player gets the complement
of the part given to the other player. Hence it is easy to see that the hyperplane
µ1 +µ2 = 1 gives all the points for the IPS given that the entire cake is divided.
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(0.5, 0.5)
µ1
µ2
1
1
Figure 1: IPS when µ1 = µ2
In this case, all points on the line are Pareto efficient since there is not
any way to make one better off without taking utility from the other. It may
also be seen that the middle point (12 ,
1
2 ) clearly fulfills each of the criteria in
Definition 1.
To continue from the somewhat trivial nature of the first example, the next
step is to see what the IPS can look like when the two measures are not identical.
Again the points (0, 1) and (1, 0) are in the IPS and the hyperplane µ1 +µ2 = 1
has to be on it in order to construct a convex set between the two points. With
these facts, it is now easy to draw such IPS with an example given in figure 2.
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
µ2
µ1
1
1
v
Figure 2: IPS when µ1 6= µ2
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There are a few interesting qualities of the IPS region that is coloured in light
grey in figure 2. Firstly, the IPS is symmetric about the point ( 12 ,
1
2 ), a property
with all possible two-player Individual Pieces Sets. This not hard to see as the
complement of any piece is given to the other player. A second interesting part
of the figure is the bolded outer boundary of the IPS. As shown by Barbanel
& Zwicker (1997) this outer boundary includes all the Pareto efficient points
which is rather intuitive as no point exists on the IPS where both measures are
higher than any point on the outer boundary.
What about the other notions of fairness? In two-player context envy-
freeness is equal to proportionality. The dark grey area includes the points
envy-free and equitable points as in that area µ1, µ2 ≥ 1/2. Hence the boldest
part of the outer bounder includes the Varian fair points. Now a diagonal line
that connects all points where µ1 = µ2 in the light grey area gives all pos-
sible equitable divisions. The point where the equitable line meets the efficient
boundary is then also clearly a DS-optimal allocation.
The interesting question now is what the IPS looks like if n > 2. As already
noted, it is by Theorem 1 closed and convex n-dimensional object, and the
points that limit it are known. The intuitive first idea by the symmetry of two-
player case is that it would be symmetric by point ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n ). However, one can
give a simple counterexample in a three-player context as the complement of one
player’s piece is divided between two other players. Then there is the question of
proportionality and envy-freeness that were so clearly visible in figure 2. Envy-
freeness and proportionality are obviously not the same with more than two
players. As it turns out, in higher dimensions the IPS picture does not alone
give a picture about envy-freeness (Barbanel 2005) and also the notion of outer
border is somewhat vague on higher dimensions so of efficiency much cannot be
said with IPS alone either. Proportionality, on the other, hand will always be
found.
5.2 Radon-Nikodym Set
The Radon-Nikodym Set (RNS) was first introduced by Dubins & Spanier (1961)
and has been extensively discussed later by Barbanel, who also introduced the
term Radon-Nikodym Set. The RNS was also used by Weller in their proof of
the existence of Varian-fair allocation (Weller 1985). The idea is essentially to
replace the measures with another function and map each point of the cake to
a simplex. As earlier, the definition is needed before getting any further.
Definition 5 (Radon-Nikodym Set (Barbanel 2000)). Define measure σ = µ1+
µ2 + · · · + µn and let fi : Ω → R be the Radon-Nikodym derivative of mi. For
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each p ∈ Ω, let f(p) = (f1(p), f2(p), . . . fn(p)). The Radon-Nikodym Set is the
set
{f(a) | a ∈ Ω}.
The Radon-Nikodym theorem (Folland 1999) says that for any subset A of
Ω, µi(A) =
∫
A
fi dσ. If absolute continuity is assumed from the measure sigma
with respect to µi, f(a) = 1 for nearly all a ∈ Ω. The only possibility for
f(a) to be zero is by absolute continuity then that all measures are zero. It is
assumed here that the functions are redefined at the possible point of f(a) = 0
to simplify the treatment of the examples. Based on the definition it can be seen
that the RNS is an n − 1-dimensional simplex in Rn denoted by ∆n−1 where
each player is located at vertices of the simplex and the value of the Radon-
Nikodym derivatives give a relative utility of a single part of the cake for each
player. Intuitively, players prefer points that are closest to their vertex in the
simplex.
With this definition, some examples can now be given that are adopted
from Barbanel (2005). The easiest example again is the case of two players and
identical measures. As the measures are identical, the Radon-Nikodym deriv-
atives are equal. Therefore both Radon-Nikodym derivatives have a constant
value 12 and the RNS consists of just a single point,
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
(1, 0) (0, 1)
Figure 3: RNS when µ1 6= µ2 and n = 2
With this, it is easy to see that with three players and identical measures,
the RNS is at the centre of an equilateral triangle and with four players the
centre of a regular tetrahedron and so on.
To get a better understanding, it would be helpful to draw this image to
more players with nonequal measures. So what the image looks like in three-
player context with µ1 = µ2 6= µ3? Since µ1 = µ2, all points lie on the line
x = y. In this example, the ratio of values that players 1 and 2 assign to each bit
of Ω is assumed to be continuous distribution compared to the values of player
3.
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(1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 1)
Figure 4: RNS when µ1 = µ2 6= µ3 and n = 3
Now that few examples are presented the interesting properties of the RNS
may be discussed. The next example is similar to the one presented by Weller (1985)
in their proof with the language of Barbanel (2000).
Denote the interior points of the simplex with ∆˚n−1 and thus
∆˚n−1 =
{
x1, x2, . . . , xn
∣∣∣xi > 0 ∀i,∑xi = 1} .
By redefining f on possible zero points, the image of f is ∆˚, i.e. f : Ω → ∆˚.
As seen in figure 4 and noted by Barbanel (2000), it is important to understand
that f is not necessarily surjective. With this in mind, take partition P =
(A1, . . . , An) and a point x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ ∆˚. P is said to be associated with
x if and only if
fi(z)
fj(z)
≥ xi
xj
∀i, j ∈ I, i 6= j
for all but measure 0 of z ∈ Pi. If P is associated with x, it is denoted by P ∈ x∗.
From Weller’s results, it is known that every partition in x∗ is Pareto efficient
and as proven by Barbanel (1999), the implication also holds conversely.
Given this, the construction of Pareto efficient partition in the RNS with
three players can be drawn. Take arbitrary closed disjoint regions R1, R2, R3 of
the simplex. Given a point x ∈ ∆˚ and partition P = (A1, A2, A3), x is in x∗ if
and only if each point of Ω mapped to Ri in the simplex with f goes to player
i. If a point is on the boundary of Ri, it goes to any of the players whose region
is on the boundary and there are multiple efficient allocations for the chosen
disjoint regions. Figure 5 represents such point x and the three regions.
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(1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 1)
x
R1 R2
R3
Figure 5: Pareto efficient point
The next interesting question is how the RNS relates to the IPS. As an
example, the IPS in figure 2 is converted to RNS. The IPS represents a two-
player game, and hence the RNS is on a line between (1, 0) and (0, 1). Re-
membering that the outer boundary of the IPS has all the Pareto efficient
points, the outer boundary is therefore in x∗. Given an arbitrary x between
the two players, if all points of Ω mapped to points between (1, 0) and x,
or R1 similarly to the previous example are given to player 1 and all points
between x and (0, 1), or R2 are given to player 2, the division is Pareto effi-
cient. Denote the set of all partitions that are in x∗ given by an arbitrary x by
m(x) = {(m1(A1),m2(A2)) | (A1, A2) ∈ x∗}. As a result, m(x) is in the outer
boundary of IPS for all x.
The outer boundary of figure 2 has three interesting parts: a straight line,
a non-differentiable point u and a curve. If the point x in the corresponding
RNS of figure 6 is between points (0, 1) and v, m(x) consists of only a partition
where the entire Ω is given to player 1 for every such x. At the point v, m(v)
consists of partitions where A1 includes only points of Ω mapped to v. As shown
by Barbanel, the ratio −v2/v1 equals the slope between the two partitions in
m(v) (Barbanel 2000), i.e. slope of the straight line in the IPS of figure 2.
Continuing on the RNS, the points between v and the start of the line, w give a
single partition P = (A1, A2) where piece A1 is at v and A2 at v or w. So this
part depicts the non-differentiable point u in figure 2. Finally, the curve of the
IPS as one might guess is depicted on the RNS as the continuous line. That is
since on the curve, there can’t be single points of Ω that give a positive measure
and there are no gaps where positive measure points could exist.
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(1, 0)
v = (v1, v2) w
(0, 1)
Figure 6: RNS picture corresponding to figure 2
The last question as with IPS is how this generalises to n players? The
graphical pictures are not viable with more than four players, but the concept
can be used to construct Pareto efficient partitions as done by Weller in their
proof (Weller 1985) and the pictures shown here are just a few special cases
with a limited number of players.
6 Algorithms
The last question considered in my thesis is how can a fair division be achieved.
The theoretical results of existence are of very little actual use if the actual
allocation is too impractical or complex to solve, and therefore, it is interesting
to find out some of the algorithms proposed in this context. The aim is not
to give a comprehensive review of the algorithmic study of the area but to
introduce some of the more notable and interesting algorithms for different
notions of fairness in games where players can’t be fully aware of other players’
utilities. Three such algorithms are discussed that reflect the evolving goals in
the literature since the era of Steinhaus.
The intuitive, classic way of dividing a cake between two players is the ”I
cut you choose” algorithm where one person cuts the cake and the other chooses
first. As already noted, it does guarantee proportionality and envy-freeness but
the all so obvious issue arising is that what if there are more than two players.
That’s what Polish mathematician Steinhaus and their students Banach and
Knaster were researching during World War II (Brams & Taylor 1996).
6.1 Banach–Knaster last-diminisher procedure
The result Banach and Knaster discovered in the 1940s for the n-player prob-
lem described by Steinhaus (1948, 1949) was to be called the last-diminisher
procedure which is in a sense a generalisation of the classic two-player solution.
The procedure does guarantee proportionality, but envy-freeness or efficiency
was not yet achieved.
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The process goes as follows. The players are ordered, and in the first round,
the first player cuts an arbitrary part from the cake. The second player has
an option to diminish the cut part. Then the third player has the option to
diminish the part that is possibly already diminished, and this continues until
the last player. The last diminisher of the part is then obliged to keep it. The
second round is now the same without the last diminisher as an n−1 game and
the last round with two players is the same as the ”I cut you choose” protocol.
The leftover pieces when a part is diminished are assumed to be combined back
into the cake.
As explained by Brams & Taylor (1996) the strategy ensuring proportionality
is where each player diminishes a part they value exactly 1/n or passes the piece
forward untouched knowing that another piece must come that is at least 1/n.
But envy-freeness can be assumed true only for the last two players as they can
take any of the pieces already diminished. And as with two players, efficiency
is not guaranteed as everyone diminishes a piece that they value at 1/n.
In addition to the last-diminisher procedure some other more efficient al-
gorithms for proportional division have been proposed as the worst case for the
last-diminisher procedure is simply O
(
n(n−1)
2
)
= O(n2). Notably Even and
Paz (1984) have proposed an O(n log n) algorithm which was later shown also
to be the lower bound for proportional division (Woeginger & Sgall 2007).
6.2 Brams & Taylor procedure
The next major challenge in the algorithmic literature of fair division was to find
an envy-free procedure. Some algorithms have been proposed for three and four
players, but the first n player algorithm was discovered in Brams and Taylor
(1995).
The algorithm is explained in 14 steps in Brams and Taylor (1995) for four
players, and due to the length the reader is referred there for a detailed explana-
tion, but it starts with one player proposing a division, and each player is asked
if they objects to proposed allocation.
The issue of Brams & Taylor procedure from an algorithmic point of view
is that it is not bounded for the number of queries or cuts. As a result, the
number of steps can not be known in advance, and the next major step in the
research was to find a bounded algorithm for envy-free division. Additionally,
the procedure does not give connected pieces of the cake for the players.
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6.3 nn
nn
nn
queries
In 2008 Stromquist showed that there are no finite algorithms for envy-free
cake division for three or more players (Stromquist 2008) and in 2009 Procaccia
gave a lower bound of Ω(n2)1 for the number steps to find an envy-free division
(Procaccia 2009).
The question of what is the algorithm that provides unconnected envy-free
division was open until 2016 when Aziz and Mackenzie described an algorithm
that has an upper bound of nn
nn
nn
queries that consist of five protocols (Aziz
& Mackenzie 2016). Again due to the complexity of this algorithm, the reader
is referred to the original publication for a detailed explanation. Even though
this breakthrough result is considerably more complex than the lower bound
established by Procaccia, it is significantly better than an unbounded solution
and the best to date.
Now the economist might ask that what about Pareto efficiency. The prob-
lem with efficiency requirement is that it needs comparisons between the players’
measures which in the theoretical results is not a problem, but in practice, the
players should be able to give an explicit function representing their utility that
could be compared with the functions of the other players. Hence in prac-
tice, achieving efficiency is rather difficult. If, however, the utilities of each
player are known a Varian-fair allocation may be solved analytically without
any effort from the players as done in Weller (1985). In the special case of a
one-dimensional interval that needs to be divided into connected pieces envy-
free allocation if efficient if preferences are strictly monotonic (Berliant et al.
1992) but as no finite procedures exist for connected pieces the only way is an
approximation algorithm described by Su (1999).
7 Conclusion
In this thesis, I tried to open some of the essential aspects of fair division
theory since the 1940s. The goals of fair division have evolved along the years,
and different notions of fairness have been introduced, but the mathematical
framework of measure theory gives a robust way to study the subject. Even
though fairness is a reoccurring question in societies, fair division literature as
such has seen surprisingly few applications outside of economists’ birthday cake
division problems.
1Note the use of big-omega notation which is not to be confused with the cake Ω.
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Fair land division is, however, a subject that has seen these concepts used in
a geometrical way with a little different model (Segal-Halevi 2017). Brams and
Taylor also cover some possible applications such as auction theory where for
example the last-diminisher procedure may be thought as a Dutch auction where
the price is diminished until someone takes it (Brams & Taylor 1996). Brams
also has a book where the fair division procedures are applied to democracy
concepts such as coalition government formation (Brams 2008). One way to view
fair division theory from an economics perspective is studying if fair allocations
can be achieved in economies where formal models are different from measure
theory (Piketty 1994, Pazner & Schmeidler 1974).
The algorithmic study of fair division is an area that has probably seen most
attention in recent years where, for example, the discovery of a bounded envy-
free algorithm was a significant breakthhrough. Computer scientists have been
recently interested in fair division also outside of pure algorithmic study where
the object of division can be for example CPU time or memory between different
users or processes and the utilities are known (Dolev et al. 2011, Gutman &
Nisan 2012).
Many of the results I introduced have been somewhat abstract and at times,
challenging to give real-world analogues. The abstractness for their part also
makes it difficult to find meaningful applications outside of research in other
fields. On the other hand, the precise mathematical language makes it possible
to discuss many of the results of fair division literature spanning over seven
decades over multiple disciplines with the same formal model.
The multidisciplinarity of fair division literature has been evident in my
thesis even though many interesting and notable papers have been left out as
I tried to keep a certain economics perspective in my thesis with providing an
overview that gives a grasp to pursue further exploration of the subject.
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